By Greg Poropat
President Trump’s recent threat to impose tariffs on Australian steel imports into the United States is not the first time Australia has faced this issue.
Twenty-three years ago, President George W. Bush placed tariffs on Australian steel imports. But only six days later the decision was reversed. Then Prime Minister John Howard boasted ‘This is the result of a very strong, effective and coordinated lobbying effort’. For four days, Howard and his Minister for Trade continued the braggadocio.
But did Bush’s about face occur because of Australian lobbying?
On 18 March 2003, Australia commenced its war against Iraq. Howard said it was only about mid-March 2003 when he decided to act. Others dispute this, claiming the decision occurred in mid-2002. But forensic analysis of the evidence suggests the decision probably was even earlier, as early as January 2001. Consider this chronology.
11 September 2001: Terrorists flew aircraft into the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field.
14 September 2001: Bruce Riedel, Bush’s Special Assistant, wrote that Bush had told the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, he planned to attack Iraq. Howard invoked the ANZUS Treaty. A few days later, he committed Australian armed forces to Afghanistan.
20-21 October 2001: At an APEC meeting, Howard met Bush and the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and discussed terrorism.
21 November 2001: Bush told his Defense Secretary to develop a plan to invade Iraq. January 2002: The US announced that tariffs would be placed on steel imports into the US, including Australian steel. Howard complained to Bush in writing.
End of January 2002: Howard visited New York and met Colin Powell.
27 February 2002: Trevor Flugge, chairperson of Australian company AWB Limited, wrote to his board advising that John Dauth, Australia’s New York-based Permanent Representative to the United Nations, had told him ‘US military action to depose Saddam Hussein was inevitable and that at this time the Australian Government would support and participate in such action’.
5 March 2002: The US imposed tariffs on Australian steel.
11 March 2002: The US revoked tariffs on BHP hot-rolled steel, which comprised the great bulk of
Australia’s steel exports to the US.
11-14 March 2002: Howard and his Trade Minister boasted about their ‘unprecedented’ achievement.
Mid-2002 onwards: Australian forces were positioned in the Middle East while Australia and the US jointly
planned Iraqi military action.
September 2002: The only 2002 Australian cabinet papers about Australia and Iraq were presented. One mentioned an oral briefing by Howard about some discussions with Bush, while the second was an oral briefing from the Minister for Foreign Affairs about a possible UN Security Council resolution.
Howard claimed the Australian-US alliance was the main reason he committed Australia to Iraq. Perhaps. But there probably was an additional reason, steel. Consider this scenario. In October 2001, Howard almost certainly knew of Bush’s Iraqi plans and Bush probably had asked him for Australian support. Howard knew this was politically problematic: Iraq was unconnected with 9/11 and he could not politically justify Australian participation. While he had few qualms about Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan, at the APEC meeting it is unlikely Howard gave Bush an unqualified commitment to participate in a war against Iraq.
Howard was cunning. After APEC and knowing Bush’s intentions, he began considering his options for securing the best outcome for himself and Australia. Given the closeness of the Australia-US relationship, the US almost certainly advised Howard’s government of the steel tariffs before they became public. This dates the advice to early January 2002 or December 2001.
The advice solved Howard’s problem. Before the tariffs were announced, Howard negotiated that in return for Australia’s commitment to war in Iraq, the US would exclude most Australian steel from the tariffs. But announcing the US concession had to wait. Awkward
questions would be asked about Australia’s favourable treatment. Howard also wanted some personal political benefit. And he knew he needed considerable time to prepare the Australian public for an Iraqi war.
With Bush’s representatives, Howard concocted a charade that the tariffs would be announced before Howard negotiated their removal. The pantomime began with his January 2001 letter to Bush and continued until March, culminating in the US concession and Howard’s parliamentary boasting.
When Howard visited New York in late January 2002, it was a done deal that Australia was committed to war in Iraq as payoff for tariff relief. Howard told John Dauth, which is why Dauth could brief Flugge so confidently.
The 2002 cabinet papers demonstrate that Australia’s commitment to war in Iraq happened in early 2002. The evidence is the absence of any substantive cabinet papers about Iraq. From at least May 2002, probable Australian military involvement in Iraq was one of the government’s most serious issues. For many months before the September oral reports to cabinet, the Australian and US military were planning the Iraqi invasion. Those activities were not public and they were not mentioned in any cabinet paper. With a commitment to war already made, cabinet papers were unnecessary.
Is more evidence needed?
Howard is not known for modesty. His autobiography is replete with self-congratulations about even trivial matters.
But he does not raise even in passing his achievement of the ‘unprecedented’ removal of the steel tariffs. He recounts so many of his US visits that at times the book resembles a travelogue: his US travels appear on more than 40 of the book’s 800 pages. But apart from a photograph of him at the fallen World Trade Centre towers, his January/February 2002 New York trip is unmentioned.
Howard did not want to encourage anyone to sift through the ashes of his dishonourable deal for steel.
The final words about this belong to Bush, someone who reputedly enjoyed a joke. On 3 May 2003 at his Texas ranch and with Howard at his side, Bush called Howard ‘a man of steel’, the sly joke between friends being that Howard was ‘a man of steel tariffs’.
– This is an edited excerpt from the book ‘John Howard Exposed: The facts he did not want you to know’ by Greg Poropat
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